Fragments that Remain of the Lost Writings of Proclus, by Thomas Taylor, [1825], at sacred-texts.com
Fragments that Remain of the Lost Writings of Proclus, by Thomas Taylor, [1825], at sacred-texts.com
If time subsist together with heaven [i.e. with the universe], and neither * can the universe exist if time is not, nor time if the universe has no existence; and if time was not, when the universe †
was not, neither will time be when the universe does not exist. For if the universe was when time was not, it then follows that time was when time was not. For that which once was is said to have existed once, in consequence of at a certain time not having existed; since it is neither that which eternally exists, nor that which never exists, but is the medium between both. But wherever there is the once, there time exists. And if the universe will be when time will not have an existence, thus passing from existing at a certain time to not existing at a certain time, * in this case, time will then be when there will be no time [because time and the universe are consubsistent]: for the term ποτε (or, at a certain time) is temporal. If, therefore, the universe neither was when time was not, neither will it be when time ceases to exist. For a subsistence at a certain time (ποτε) which pertains to both these, time not existing, will yet be temporal. † Time therefore always is. For to a subsistence at a certain time, either the always is
opposed, or the never. But it is impossible that the never should be opposed to it; for, in short, time has an existence. Hence, time is perpetual. But heaven [or the universe] is consubsistent with time, and time with heaven. For time is the measure of the motion of heaven, just as eternity is of the life of animal itself; * which thing itself spews that time is perpetual. For if this be not admitted, either eternity will be the paradigm of nothing, time not existing, though eternity exists, or neither will eternity itself possess the power of always remaining that which it is; † in consequence of the paradigm of either passing from non-existence into existence, or into non-existence from existence. The heaven therefore always ‡ is, in the same manner as time, proceeding into existence together with time, and being generated
neither prior nor posterior to time; but, as Plato says, it was generated, and is, and will be, through the whole of time. *
41:* Ουτε is here omitted in the original, but it is obviously necessary that it ought to be inserted; and this is confirmed by the version of Mahotius, who found ουτε, in this place in his MS.; for his version is "neque cœlum est, si non sit tempus," &c.
41:† Ουρανος is here wanting in the original; or, at least, it is requisite to conceive it to be implied. Philoponus, however, not perceiving this, though it must be evident to every one who understands the reasoning of Proclus, has, as usual, made himself ridiculous in his attempt to confute this fifth argument.
42:* If the universe will be when time has no existence, it will then not exist at a certain time, because time is no more. But as will be pertains to time,—time, as Proclus says, will then be when there will be no time.
42:† Because if time once was not, or if time hereafter will not be, then in either case there will be a tirade when there is no time, which is absurd.
43:* Eternity hi the second monad, and animal itself, or the paradigm of the universe, is the third monad of the intelligible triad. See the Third Book of my Translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.
43:† The original of this sentence is, ινα μη ο αιων ἣ μηδενος ᾖ παραδειγμα χρονου, μη οντος αιων υπαρχων, ἣ μηδε αυτος εχῃ το αει μενειν ο εστι. But it is necessary to alter the punctuation of the former part of it, so as to render it conformable to the above translation; and instead of reading παραδειγμα χρονου, μη οντος αιων υπαρχων, to read παραδειγμα, χρονου μη οντος, αιων υπαρχων.
43:‡ In the original, και ο ουρανος αρα εστιν; but it is obviously necessary to read και ο ουρανος αει αρα εστιν.