Correspondence, by Benedict de Spinoza, [1883], at sacred-texts.com
Correspondence, by Benedict de Spinoza, [1883], at sacred-texts.com
[Oldenburg adduces certain further objections against Spinoza's doctrine of necessity and miracles, and exposes the inconsistency of a partial allegorization of Scripture.]
To the most illustrious Master Benedict de Spinoza Henry Oldenburg sends greetings.
In your last letter, 2 written to me on the 7th of February, there are some points which seem to deserve criticism. You say that a man cannot complain, because God has denied him the true knowledge of Himself, and strength sufficient to avoid sins; forasmuch as to the nature of everything nothing is competent, except that which follows necessarily from its cause. But I say, that inasmuch as God, the creator of men, formed them after His own image, which seems to imply in its concept wisdom, goodness, and power, it appears quite to follow, that it is more within the sphere of man's power 3 to have a sound mind than to have a sound body. For physical soundness of body follows from mechanical causes, but soundness of mind depends on purpose
and design. You add, that men may be inexcusable, 1 and yet suffer pain in many ways. This seems hard at first sight, and what you add by way of proof, namely, that a dog 2 mad from having been bitten is indeed to be excused, but yet is rightly killed, does not seem to settle the question. For the killing of such a dog would argue cruelty, were it not necessary in order to preserve other dogs and animals, and indeed men, from a maddening bite of the same kind.
But if God implanted in man a sound mind, as He is able to do, there would be no contagion of vices to be feared. And, surely, it seems very cruel, that God should de. vote men to eternal, or at least terrible temporary, torments, for sins which by them could be no wise avoided. Moreover, the tenour of all Holy Scripture seems to suppose and imply, that men can abstain from sins. For it abounds in denunciations and promises, in declarations of rewards and punishments, all of which seem to militate against the necessity of sinning, and infer the possibility of avoiding punishment. And if this were denied, it would have to be said, that the human mind acts no less mechanically than the human body.
Next, when you proceed to take miracles and ignorance to be equivalent, you seem to rely on this foundation, that the creature can and should have perfect insight into the power and wisdom of the Creator: and that the fact is quite otherwise, I have hitherto been firmly persuaded.
Lastly, where you affirm that Christ's passion, death, and burial are to be taken literally, but His resurrection allegorically, you rely, as far as I can see, on no proof at all. Christ's resurrection seems to be delivered in the Gospel as literally as the rest. And on this article of the resurrection the whole Christian religion and its truth rest, and with its removal Christ's mission and heavenly doctrine collapse. It cannot escape you, how Christ, after He was raised from the dead, laboured to convince His disciples
of the truth of the Resurrection properly so called. To want to turn all these things into allegories is the same thing, as if one were to busy one's self in plucking up the whole truth of the Gospel history.
These few points I wished again to submit in the interest of my liberty of philosophizing, which I earnestly beg you not to take amiss.
Written in London, 11 Feb., 1676.
I will communicate with you shortly on the present studies and experiments of the Royal Society, if God grant me life and health.
307:2 Letter XXV.
307:3 Potestas, as distinguished from potentia—the word just above translated power—means power delegated by a rightful superior, as here by God. So it is rendered here "sphere of power," and in Tract. Pol. generally "authority." It would not be proper to say that the "image of God" implied potestas.
308:1 Surely this is a mistake for "excusable."—[Tr.]
308:2 See Letter XXV. Oldenburg misunderstands Spinoza's illustration, because he takes "canis" in the phrase, "qui ex morsu canis furit," to be nominative instead of genitive; "a dog which goes mad from a bite," instead of "he who goes mad from the bite of a dog."